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impact of Germany’s failure to integrate
its intelligence. However, Rhys-Jones all
but ignores America’s involvement and
fails to include much of the German materials that detail the political factors
driving Admiral Raeder and explain the
naval staff’s objections to executing Operation RHINE in May 1941. Neither
book tells the story completely; but if
one must choose, The Loss of the Bismarck provides a better naval story,
while The Destruction of the Bismarck
provides the better strategic treatment.
CARL O. SCHUSTER

Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Kailua, Hawaii

Strachan, Hew. The First World War: To Arms.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. 1,127pp.
$39.95

What began as a single-volume replacement of Oxford University Press’s
long-running World War I survey (A
History of the Great War, by C. R. M. F.
Cruttwell [1934]) has, in Hew Strachan’s
hands, burgeoned into three mammoth
volumes, of which this is the first. The
second, we are told, will cover the years
1915 and 1916 and will be called No
Quarter. The third and final volume, entitled Fall Out (reader be warned that the
first volume has been in the making
since 1989), will pick up in the winter of
1916 and push through to the end of the
war.
Since this first volume alone runs to
1,127 pages, readers will want to know
how this book differs from an already
crowded field. The answer is that it looks
at topics—origins, war planning, tactics,
munitions crises, morale—in a broad
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comparative context. No blundering
great power is unfairly singled out.
As is obvious from the subtitle, the
book is about the origins of the war,
mobilization, and opening campaigns.
To rephrase what has already been written many times over by battalions of
historians is no easy task, but Strachan
rises to the challenge. Better yet, he
works through all the latest literature
in English, French, and German to provide the most up-to-date interpretation
of the war’s outbreak. In common with
most historians, Strachan points to the
shakiness of the German Empire and its
nervous quest for status and security as
the main causes of the war. A chief
abettor was Austria-Hungary, whose
own military had become so enfeebled
by the continuous Vienna-Budapest
budget skirmishes that war in 1914 appeared the only way to rally the monarchy behind a much-needed program of
rearmament. Similar calculations prevailed in Russia, where the tsar hoped
that mobilization in defense of Serbia
would heal political wounds and stop a
politico-economic strike wave that had
escalated from 222 strikes in 1910 to
3,534 in the first half of 1914. France
and Great Britain appear more benign;
Strachan concludes from the most recent French scholarship that there was
no real war fever in France—révanche
was a slogan of certain pressure groups.
Britain was hamstrung between its fleet
and “continentalists” clustered around
General Henry Wilson.
Strachan’s analysis of the competing war
plans is excellent. Regarding the
Schlieffen Plan, he describes Moltke the
Younger’s growing unease with the
seven-to-one ratio set by Albert von
Schlieffen to overweight the “right
hook” through Belgium and Holland
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that would envelop a French thrust into
Lorraine. Although Wilhelm Groener
and B. H. Liddell Hart later blasted
Moltke for his timidity—he reduced the
ratio of troops on the right wing to those
on the left to three to one—Strachan
points out that “an army would [not]
behave as a united mass, gaining impetus on its right specifically from the
weakness of its left,” for an army “is a
combination of individuals and not a
weight obeying the laws of physics.”
That is precisely the point: the Schlieffen
Plan was undone not by its relative
weighting but by inadequate transport
and insoluble problems of supply. Each
German corps required twenty-four kilometers of road space, and there was just
not enough of that on the right wing
once the Belgians tore up their railways
and Holland was foreclosed as a corridor. Add to this the fact that no fewer
than 60 percent of German trucks had
broken down by late August 1914, and it
is easier to explain the German floundering at the Marne. There was also the
small problem of French resistance.
Having begun the war with tactics that
were notoriously “perplexed by the
problems of firepower,” the German
army faced French forces, commanded
by Field Marshal J. J. C. Joffre, that
hacked five entire German corps to
pieces in the last week of August and the
first week of September 1914. Strachan’s
larger analysis of this Battle of the Marne
is interesting. The German high command’s initial response to the defeat—
Moltke and thirty-two other generals
were dismissed—was to blame individuals, “to make the debate about operational ideas, not about grand strategy.”
In fact, the Marne was a strategic failing
that should have discredited the kaiser
and his army, which “had failed to succeed in its prime role.” Yet there was no
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healthy introspection or self-assessment;
the imperial army would simply hammer
away for another four years.
In contrast to the western front, hammering seemed to work in the East,
where the Germans shattered the Russians at Tannenberg and the AustroHungarians achieved some early successes in Galicia. However, there too
the war stagnated for logistical reasons;
with Germany committed on the western front and Russia’s strength divided
by French demands for an attack on
East Prussia, it was difficult to mass
troops and artillery anywhere on the
eastern front, and yet more difficult to
move them, given the poverty of
communications.
Although the production of this
three-volume history of World War I
will take far longer than the Great War
itself took to fight, readers willing to enter the trenches with this first volume
will be rewarded with a kaleidoscopic
and elegantly written presentation of the
great issues and problems raised by the
war’s origins, campaigns, and home
fronts.
GEOFFREY WAWRO

Naval War College

Uhrowczik, Peter. The Burning of Monterey: The
1818 Attack on California by the Privateer
Bouchard. Los Gatos, Calif.: Cyril Books, 2001.
170pp. $12.95

I am a resident of Monterey. Everyone
here knows about the Carmel Mission
and Father Junipero Serra. Colton Hall,
where the California Constitutional
Convention was held, still stands, as a
preserved historic landmark. Cannery
Row likewise remains, though John
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